its fascination and attraction:i n2 002, aV ancouver post-punko r" death rock" band was formed that changed its name to "A SpectreisHaunting Europe"afew years later, eschewing variations of the spectre and simply goingb ack to the Manifestos literal opening statement. Themost fundamentalanalytical account of Marxs phrase and of its "spectral" impactinour timehas been delivered by Jacques Derrida, in his SpectersofMarx.
3
As apreamble to this article (section1), Iwill introduce yet another spectre: the spectre of growth. As Iwill demonstrate in the analysis succeeding thispreamble,t he spectre of growth has al ot to do with its Marxist archetype,s ince it leads us back to the theoretical basis of Marxs political theory:H egelian dialectics.Itisthe dialecticalmovementasacentral "subject" À driving force and object matter À of Hegels thought,t hat Iw ill articulate as a sacrificial logic (section2).
But Sloterdijk, maybe inadvertently,isright too:the spectre Marx has set free is at the same time the spectre of religion. Fort he sacrificial logic active in the dialectical movement in turn leads us back to monotheism and its complexviews on and experiences of sacrifice. Them onotheistic legacy still active in our time entailsaspecific transformation of sacrifice:atransformationt hat is in fact a dialecticization (and from there,auniversalization, ethicization and spiritualization)o fs acrifice,c onverging in Hegels thought( section 3). However, if the spectre of growthisinfact the spectre of dialectical sacrifice, one will have to raise the question whether it is possible to think beyond this spectral logic: beyond dialectics,and maybe even beyond sacrifice.Such an immense question can only be suggested "between the lines" of this article,limited in volume as it needs to be, and in afinal coda.
Growth
Growth and growing appear to be an on-negotiablet rutha nd foundation of modernt imes. This becomes apparent above all in modern economy and economic thinking,a nd its system of an ever expanding free market ruled by competition betweenowners of capital. In this system called, as well all know,capitalism,g rowth is the equivalent of the never ending accumulation of capital, strived for by the owners of this capital. Capital can accumulate itself only whenit engenders profit, gain, interest, surplus value:t hese words,t hat have crepti nto modern languages as signifiers everybody immediately can handle and understand, are just afew of the many denominators and indicators of growth.Capital, in other words,i so nly meaningful when it increases:w hen it is on the move constantly,making huge profits that enable even huger re-investments,sothat it will never stopaccumulating. It increases whenitlaunches new technologies for 3D errida 1994, esp.Ch. I. new products,d esignsn ew infrastructures to facilitate the flow of capital by a quick and effective distribution of products, exploresn ew ways of exploiting naturalresources and of appropriating the ecologicalsystem of the planet for its own purposes À of "de-naturizing nature";itincreases when it conquers and even inventsn ew markets of consumers,a nd engages new production forces in the shape of new groupsof(preferably) cheaplaborers.These are some centralfeatures of modern capitalism that reflectt he massive emphasis on the logic of "crescendo" inherent to the economic thinking of modernity.
Once national, European and, ultimately, global economies do not growanymore,o ne speaks of ar ecession, and soon of ac risis.M aybe this is what Marx wanted to address when he described capitalism as a political economy: it is based on the political decision (self-evident, almost unconscious) that economic life be a life of endless growth. Strangely,t he political movement opposing and challenging capitalism since Marxs time,socialism or communism, is even more indebted to this truth and foundation of growth. Its beliefinahistoryofprogress leading to an "ideal state" is critical of capitalisms unjust distribution of evergrowingwealth, but it does not criticize the foundation itself;onthe contrary,in the end, allofhumanity should benefit from growth.The crises in aworld based on the fevers and growingp ains of capitalism, first in the nineteen thirties of the previous century,then in the eightiesand at presentinour new century in the form of ab ank and monetary crisis,m ay have puzzled the believers in capitalist and socialist doctrine,the idea that growth and expansion is acompulsory dynamics of modernlife has remained intacteven so.This economic principle rules from right to left, and dominates the unstable societies we arel iving in, that profit from capitalism and are being jeopardized by it at the sametime.Since the implosion of communist totalitarianism in the lastdecades, there appears to be no alternative to the whims and caprices of capitalistgrowth À and it is doubtful that communism has ever been an alternativetoitinthe first place.The voices of those who at least warn against an ecologicaldisaster caused by growth, still remain weak, the gestures of thosewho decide to "occupy"parts of the western worlds cities for no other reason than to raise asimplequestion:why growth?, still remain vulnerable and uncertain À and hence are easily laughed away.
Consequently,t he growth principle governsn ot only the economy,b ut all of our societies,a ll of our lives.I tg overns workingl ife first and foremost:o nce someone does no longer "grow" in his career, he is judged to become marginal in the organization in which he is employed, then he is labelled superfluous,a nd ultimately denounced as afailure.Inmany European languagesone finds avariation of this Englishs aying À that is amongt he most heardi nthe fieldso f economy, trade and work:"Standstill is decline".
Growth and its parallels,expansion, dynamics,improvementorscoring, seems to be the sign of the time -ofthe waymodernpeople work in the world and of the way they view the world. Thew orld, our world À that is,t he world that is our property and playground for growing À,isabove all a process. Also whenone does not work, one likes to grow,tobeonthe move toward what one is not now.One "grows" in ones relationships,asitissaid, or one "grows" as aperson.Most of the now popular ethics of life style and of the "art of living" is dependent on this logic. One has to work on oneself,improve oneself,and this is usually conceptualized as asearch for ones truth and authenticity À ones better self À,asearch that should never stop:o nly in this way we become more self-controlled, determinate, "mindful". To mention one further example,modern holidays,too,are processes in whichone likes to explorenew countriesand cultures,enriching oneself while absorbing new impressions. "Expanding borders", for instance,isone of the key metaphors in the language of present day commercials.
But why is the idea of growth such astrongidea?Because -and here Ireturnto the hypothesis formulated in the opening-since the beginning of western history, and in particular since the rise of modernity,ithas taken acomplexform:the form of adialectical dynamics,based not on growth itself but on sacrifice.Let us now explore the possibilities of this hypothesis.
Dialectical Growth -the Secular Sacrifice

ClassicalDialectics:The Method
In western Antiquity,i nt he Middle Ages,b ut also,f or instance, in Indian philosophyd ialectics indicates as pecific kind of philosophical reasoning through dialogue.Inthe dialogue,ofwhich those of Socrates are the most famous, both partners depend on one another;personalviews and convictions must be risked, tested and reformulated in the process of the exchange witht he other,s ot hat between the two the truth will emerge.I nt his sense,d ialectical dialogue is different from classical debate (in whichthe debaters hold on as long as they can to their opinions,t ryingt oc onvince the other of the correctness of these opinions and "winning" the contest in this way) and from classical rhetoric (in which a speakera ttempts to persuade an audience to follow his opinion, using the instruments of attraction and seduction through eloquence). In ad ialecticale xchange the partners need to temporarily give up their knowledge,i nsights and views,inorder to obtain something new and better from the exchange,from the encounter with the other.procedure:d ialectic dialogue is fundamentally relational and reciprocal, and hence it always involves some loss of the self.
Modern Dialectics:Hegels Innovation:Dancing around the Negative
In modernity this relational approacht or eason and to its critical potential has been deepened out by manythinkers.Let me just mention one of them:Kant, as a brief stepping stone to our main area of questioning, that of Hegelswork.
Kants concept of "purer eason" indicates ar easont hat relates with reality, manipulating it and being manipulated by it À this is acontinuous process,and as a consequence (1) no reason can ever claim to be ultimately" pure", but must developasense 5 of its finitude;(2) dialectical reasoning is no longeraimed at the establishment of truth, but at the discovery of the inaccessibility of truth:t he processesofour reasoning are always exceeded, transcended by the Ding an sich one cannot properly "know".
However,after Kants innovations in the use of dialectics as arelation between subjecta nd object, that generatesasense of the finitude of this relation, it is in Hegels work that dialectics is finally and explicitly broadened to auniversaland all-encompassing logic.Itisnolonger limited to (a specific way of) reasoning, nor to epistemology, but becomes an ontological and existential term. Dialectics is the way history proceeds,and it is the way humans live their existence in that history. In Hegels phenomenological project, dialectics winds up beingm ore than a method:it is afundamental featureofbeing itself.One goes from methodology to ontology here.T his Hegelian ontology is,n eedless to say,n ot ac lassical metaphysical theory of being as substance or essence,but it is radically relational:in this sense Hegel builds on Kant and in fact on the entire tradition of dialectical dialogue.But the relation is appliedtoexistence,tolife itself;that is the first new element here.
What type of relation arewedealing with, then?What is new in Hegels system of dialectical life?O fc ourse,t his relation is not simply af unction of two preexistent subjects -orofasubject and an object -that temporarily form arelation with one another,asifthe relation were their product, the result of their intentionalact. Therelation itself becomes important, as an event between two subjects and not as their function. But again, this is not new in Hegel:a sw esaw above, dialectical dialogue has alwaysconcentrated on a"truth" "happening" between the partners.N ew in Hegels approach to dialectics is not the between and the event itself,but the way he fills this event with anew meaning:that of negativity or, 5T hroughouth is three Critiques,K ant uses sometimes sensus,s ometimes Anschauung or Erfahrung (often translated as intuition and as experience), sometimes Einbildung to address and articulate variousaspects of this sense of the finitude,that is,of the limits of human reason. in aless conceptual and more fluid formulation, of the negative. That is the second new element here.Itisinthis negative center of the dialectical relation that one finds sacrifice in its modern, secular form.
2.2.1. The Self and theNegative Hegel viewsthis relation as one of the self and the other. Theself (subject, identity, ego,toname some of its signifiers) can never rest in itself and coincide with itself: it has to be on the move À it has to grow.Inorder to develop itself and "realize" itself,a sH egel calls it, the self has to move away from itself,r isk, leave,l ose, alienateitself.More precisely,ithas to give itself awaytothe other:towhom or what is strange to me and does not coincidewith my identity.Meanwhile,the other does likewise, giving up his self reciprocally.T he formal terminology for this movement is the famous triad thesis -a ntithesis-synthesis,t hat Hegel himself never used, 6 but that summarizes and simplifies Hegels own theoryofnegation and sublation:t he self (thesis)c an only become" presence to self" by negating itself (antithesis), and, through that mediating negation, sublate (aufheben)itself (synthesis). Thenegative momentasthe confronting encounter with the other is the axis aroundw hich turnst he entire dynamics:i ta lways comes back to the negative.After all, the self is nothing else than this negative moment:itcan only be "itself" in the negationofself,and is nothing "in itself". This self-on-the-move, this self without selfness, Hegel calls "spirit". Thenegative this spirit exposesitself to,this negative as and with the other (the negative is in away the other,and it is the event to whicht he self abandonsi tself together with the other whod oes likewise) is often described by Hegel in terms of death and dying, as well as of the endurance of thisdeath:inother words,itisdescribed in terms of sacrifice.Death and destruction appear here as moments that are of the greatest importance for life and construction.The dialectical movement, as Hegel thinksit, is asacrificial movement on afundamental level. It temporarily enacts death as avital element of the life of the self,a nd it does so in ar itual way:t he enactment has to be repeatedt ime and again, since it forms,a sw es aw above,t he basic ontological structure of life and history.
But the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinksfrom death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment,i tf inds itself. It is this power, not as something positive which closes its eye to the negative, as when we say of somethingthat it is nothing or false,and then, having done with it, turn away and pass on to something else;onthe contrary,Spirit is this power only by lookingthe negative in the face,and tarrying with it. This tarrying with the negative is the magical powerthat converts it into being. 7 6I twas Fichte who developed this triadic structure,and later it was used by Heinrich M. Chalybäus in order to explainHegels philosophy. 7H egel 1977, §32, p. 19. In this passage,H egels language -m aybe inadvertently -i se mbedded in the vocabulary of sacrifice.T he negativee vent defining the Spirit has "magical power" (earlier in this section he speakso ft he "tremendous power of the negative"), and actually this event is a"conversion", atransformative gesture characteristic of many forms of sacrificial rituals.More importantly, "Spirit" is defined here as this death-enacting, sacrificial self,t hat lives its life in ac ontinuous movement of negation and sublation.
The Sublated Self and the Negative
But let us not pinpoint and fixateHegels idea too easily here:the sublated self is not simply some goal achieved, afinal point of the dialectical unrest. Hegel thinks the sublated self,t he "other",h igher, elevated, "grown" self,i nt erms of pure becoming,o ri nfinite finitude:i ti ss till am ovement,n ot the fullfilment of a movement;a nd it refers back to the centrale vent of negation.S ublation "is" nothing, it is simply and radically:becoming.The sublated self detaches itself from immediate selfhood, it "loosensitself" (ab-solvere)from any self-being, and in this way becomes "absolute", as Hegel states.T he absolute is not what it looks like, and partakesinthe negativemomentinstead of overcoming it. It is not life after death, but life in death.The "livingSubstance", Hegel formulates in his typically enigmatic and concentrated style, "is actual [one can also say:r ealized, or sublated -LtK] only in the movement […] of the mediation of its self-othering with itself.This Substance is,assubject, pure, simple negativity…" 8 Again we see that the "living substance" Hegel refers to here (a substance that is no classic substans at all, sincei t" lives" and hence is pure becoming) can only keep on "dancing" aroundt he negative,m ediating between different positions. In fact it is this negative,envelopedasitisinits own dance.Inother words,this "living substance" is the Spirit of sacrificet hat holds the entire structure of the dialectical system together.
Modern Growth and its Success:From Linearity to Dialectics
If Hegel is right in extending dialectics to individual and collective life itself,then consequently that typically modern feature we earlier designated as growth is more complex than it seems.I ti sn ot as imple, natural, linear process toward a given end, but it is an ambivalent movement in which interruption or interception are the basic categories: what is can only grow by risking everything, including itself.There is no straightforward "walkingthe line" from a to b,where the walker -t he self -w ould remain intact. Reaching for b -t he other -i nvolvest he disintegration of a and of its walking action:the line must be interrupted, broken,in order to be successful. Moderngrowth is dialectical:itisaquestion of losing and 8I bid., §18, p. 10. finding oneself,o fhumiliation and elevation, of sacrifice,and gain through sacrifice.One grows by sacrificing oneself À one grows by not growing.Increase and decrease become dialectically entangled here.
Moreover, dialectical growth turns out to be avery active gesture,instead of being alinear processthat has its own automatic movement and that befalls the self,l ike in the growth of aj uvenile body towarda dulthood. On the contrary, modernman has to do alot in order to grow,whether this be of the order of the accumulation of his possessions or of the improvement and elevation of his personality and existence.Hehas to invest what he has,what he is,expose himself to the uncertainties and risks of the secular sacrifice analyzed by Hegel as the event of negation, and finally,throughthese challenges,hemanages to grow.Itisthis active structureofdialectics that renders the modern preoccupation with growth so successful. Sacrifice developsinto something one does to and with oneself:it fills the abyss opened by secularization (the death of God),byrecreating aform of sacrifice that does no longer need gods to sacrifice to.Inthe dialectical movement circulating aroundt he negative moment, sacrifice becomes ag ift to oneself throughag ift of oneself.W ew ill have to return to this fundamentalc ohesion between western,modern sacrifice and self-sacrifice later on.
9
9H egel thinks this continuous circulation of the self around its moment of negation as the definition of self-consciousness,esp.inPart IV of Phenomenology of Spirit. After having identifieddialectics as negative moment in §204, in §205 he then describes the dynamics of self-conciousness as an "absolutedialectical unrest". Theself that takes his "self" as its primary object, its "reality" to be "realized" through sacrifice,i sn ever "itself", never "self-identical", but consists in its "own" "process", its "own" movement (of negation,s ublation, of lost-and-found), that is,i ts "own" unrest of which it is fully aware.But it is just in this processthat this consciousness,instead of being self-identical, is in fact nothing but apurely casual, confusedmedley,the dizziness of aperpetually selfengendered disorder. It is itselfa ware of this;f or it maintains and creates this restless confusion. (Hegel 1977, §205, p. 124 f.)L ater, in 1830, Hegel applies this concept of unrest to the spirit itself:"Spirit is not an inert being,b ut on the contrary,a bsolutely restless…".See Hegel 1971, §378, p. 3 . See on the notion of dialectical unrest also Nancy 2002. Nancy connects the unrest of the self with thato ft he world À of the way sense emerges and recedes in theworld, asaninfinitly finite event. "This world is therefore not as imple result, nor does it have ar esult. It is the world itself thatr esults in its own movement, and the thought of its own truth is itself, in turn, am ovementa nd ar estlessness À the very same,infact, to the extent that it is restlessness of self,for itself,and uneasy aboutitself;and because it reveals itself as other, infinitely in the other."(Ibid.,p. 6)
Growth and Crisis:The Economy of Sacrifice
Let us return briefly to our openinganalyses.The examples of what we have called the "spectre of growth" all follow the dialectical logic clarified above.This spectre is modern precisely because it is as acrificial spectre.T hat is most and for all apparent in the way capitalisteconomy creates its own crises,and ultimately war as the temporary,radical destructionofcapital.
10 Investing money -with different degrees of risk -inorder to make profit with it is the daily dialectical pattern of capitalism, ap attern raised to ah ighly speculative and spectacular level in the stock markets.B ut the crises in this hectic system shouldn ot be interpreted as temporary flaws and drawbacksi nt he system:t hey belong to its structureo f negation and sacrifice.Marx was quick to observe this,for exampleinhis Theories of Surplus Value: "Crisis is no contingency but acertainty";and "The crisis is the manifestation of all the contradictions of bourgeois economy".
11 These contradictions Marx analyzesh ere in discussion with David Ricardoa re the contra-10 Among the abundant literature on the relationbetween capitalism andwar Ijust mention amore recent study,that offers an informative overview of the debate as wellasa first historicala nalysis of the new civil and ethnic wars following the downfallo ft he Soviet empire,and the wars on terroroccupying American foreign politics after 9/11: Nitzan /B ichler 2004, pp.255-327. That war would be an integral element of the free market system refers to abroader approach to war, in philosophical and historical research, exploring war as aform of sacrifice,asasudden outburst of the negative event, in which acollective,anation gives itself away in excess and ecstasy in order to assert itself anew.I nt his violent sacrifice one would meet the religious and esthetic reservoirs of modernr ational culture.S een this way,m odernw ar appears as the most intense and radical moment of the dialectical movement, as its ultimate expression. This hypothesis is treated in an equally abundant amounto fl iterature.Ijust mention Georges Batailles work on the "experience" of war as av oid within culture,l eaning in particular on Nietzsches critique of modernrationality and instrumentality.Bataille concentrateshis explorations on the Second World Wara nd on the understandingo fm odern fascism. With regard to the First World Wart here is Modris Eksteinss amazings tudy Rites of Spring:The Great Warand the Birth of the Modern Age;Eksteins analyzes the growing desire for agreat sacrifice in French, German and English cultureinthe fin de sicle: "The war, ironically,w as am atter of life,n ot death;i tw as an affirmation of vitality,e nergy, virtue.T he war was am attero fa rt,"h ep araphrases Hermann Hesse (94).I no rder to demonstrate the cohesion of art and warfare,o ft he radically new directions taken in music, theatre,p ainting etc. and the interruptive freshnesso fw ar, Eksteins presents Stravinskysa nd Diaghilevs ballet "Le sacre du printemps" (1913) as the shocking choreographic and musical announcement of ap olitical event that would exceedt he limits of diplomacy:t he Great War. Ther elation between war and sacrifice andi ts connectionwith modern dialectics is an important theme withinthe context of my line of thoughthere,but Icannot go into it any further now.See also Te nKate 1994, esp.ch. II. 11 Marx, Theories of Surplus Va lue (1861-1863), ch. XVII, §10. dictionso fd ialectics,i nt hat the bourgeois can only effectuate progress and growth by risking it, thereby risking the lives of the "production forces" (the workers) he is dependentonfor the accumulation of his capital. As amatter of fact, "the very nature of capital leads to crises", Marx states time and again in this text.
12 Marxs analysis was provocative in his time,but has not lost any of its actual relevance.R ecently,t he economist Andrew Kliman has convincingly deconstructedt he crises in the American economy,a nd its global consequences,b y demonstratinghow the "destruction of capital" is avital force in the economy. 13 Kliman is only one of many scholarsp ointing at this paradox. We will have to conclude that the sacrificial logic underlying modern growth is far froma ni nnocent rituality "also" belonging to modern history;quite to the contrary,being its drivingforce,itmay set the scene for adestruction beyond control and without return of this world.
We have seen how Hegel, leaning on Kants preparatory investigations,i ntroduces an ew concept of dialectics touchingu pon al ogic of sacrifice.H egel claims that this concept may elucidate modernity and its unique history,a nd uncover its prime driving force.Indoingso, however, Hegel does not only look into the future;herephrases adialectical dynamics hidingwithin western culture since its beginning. Ther eligions of the West:t he three monotheisms,a nd particularly Christianity,h ave contributed to ag reat extent to the imagination, ritualization and examination of this dynamics.Inthis sense,the "spirit" articulated in the conceptual framework of dialectical phenomenology, the spirit of modern life,l eads us back in many ways to the "Spirit of Christianity" and its "Fate" that Hegel already investigatesi nh is early works.
14 Let us exploree lementsofthis legacy in the following section.
12 Ibid., opening statement of the chapter, and passim. Afew years later, in Capital, Marx refines this by giving amercilessreconstruction of the development of the English cotton industrybetween 1830-1860, showingh ow this has produced an excess of alternating crises and booms(some no longer than one year) only to end up being the most flourishing and wealth generatingE nglish industry towards1 860… In 1863 the entire cotton productiondefinitely collapses. It is this immense inconsistency and inefficacy,this relentless destruction at the cost of countless exploited lives,aswell as the class resistance against it, that interests Marx. See Marx, Capital, ch. 13, §7. 13 See Kliman 2007; esp.Id. 2009 , pp.47-54. 14 See Hegel 1996 3. The Secular Sacrifice:Prefigurations in Western History:The Monotheistic Legacy
If Hegel is first and foremost rephrasing an inheritance,then when in our cultural history did this dialecticalpreference begin to emerge?And what has happened to sacrifice if it is true that this history,l ong before Hegel, is to be qualifieda s dialectical? So far,wehave analyzed to what extent dialectics bears asacrificial kerneli ni t. Let us turn this question around,a nd see whether sacrifice has a dialecticalkernel since the beginningofthe West. In ordertodoso, Iwill partly make use of the thought of Nancyinasfar as this is relevant for our topic.
3.1. Nancy and the "Westernization" of Sacrifice
In his text "The Unsacrificeable" (1990) Nancydevelops ahistorical and philosophical account of the differences between on the one hand pre-westernand nonwesterntraditions of immolation and sacrifice,and western sacrifice on the other: "What is the nature of the Wests initial relation to sacrifice?M ore precisely: upon what kind of relation to the sacrifices of the rest of humanity […] does the West map out, so to speak,its own sacrifice?"
15
Nancyd epicts this differential relation by indicating three features in which western sacrifice distinguishes itself from the long traditions of sacrifice that do not fit into this western logic,o rr emain at the margino fi t: from what Nancy, rather quickly and easily,names "the rest of humanity."
16 First, western sacrifice is no longers imply bound to specific moments and places:i ti sh appening always and everywhere.Second, western sacrifice losesits exemplary and substitutional character. And third, it distances itself from instrumentality,having no longer any goal than itself and its own gesture.
SacrificeBreaking with Time and Place
From time immemorial sacrificial rites,p racticeso rg estures have been momentary events,dependentonaspecific and uniqueoccasion (even though this occasion may repeati tself in as teady pattern, like daily) and usually also on a 15 Nancy 2003, pp.51-77; 54. 16 As if this "rest" has not been penetrated and determined by westernculture at least since the latterestablished itself as "global" or "globalization"; and as if this "rest" has not started penetrating, fascinating,challengingand transforming the West sinceits beginnings.Sloterdijk, and in differentbut parallel fashion Nancy,both have,bythe way, critically analyzed how and why the history of the "West" and that of globalization coincidei nafundamental way:w estern culture is the culture of the discovery,t he exploration and colonizationo fthe globe À a"coincidence" that has been broughttoi ts peek in modern capitalism. See Sloterdijk 2005, and Nancy2007. specially designated place:the altar,the temple,amountain, the home, the front door… Here,o ne sacrifices some object(s) or victim in order to achieve something:toavert acurse,topropitiate the gods,tomake atonement, to undergo an ordeal,t oe xpressg ratitude,t oa sk for ab lessing or benediction.S acrifice is a temporary step outside regularlife,and cannot be identified with that life.But this identification is precisely what happens to sacrifice in the West, Nancy observes: "The uniqueness of sacrificeisthus transferred -ordialecticized -from aposition of exemplary uniqueness,w hose value lies in its exemplarity […] ,t ot he uniqueness of the life and of the substance in which -ortowhich -every singularity is sacrificed." 17 Nancys howsh ow especially in Christianity this transfer has taken place,f or instance in Pauls criticismofpagan sacrificeasagainst Christs sacrificial life to be worshipped and imitated by the Christians,orinAugustines view on sacrifice:the entire "City" of believers is constantlyoffered to God in one universal sacrifice, or:t he soul itself should become as acrifice when it offers itself to God. 18 Here sacrifice detaches itself from its concrete occasion, and becomes the infinite gift of self to the other:God. This dialectical life,Nancysummarizes in Hegelian terms, "is,inand for itself,nothingother than sacrifice."
19 Not amazingly,Nancystates that at the end of this western-Christian processo fac ertain infinitization of sacrifice,"we find Hegel". 20 3.1.2. Sacrifice Breaking with Exemplarity:The Triumph of Self-sacrifice But if sacrifice is alife,and not aspecial event interruptinglife,what is left to be sacrificed?Int he sacrificialt raditionst he West is breaking awayf rom, the sacrificed is almost always as ubstitute for the sacrifier. This substitute,o ften the animal, but in some ancient cultures,l ike the Aztec civilization,a lso ah uman being, is the exemplary figure representing those who perform the sacrificial practice.T he substitute is literally an exemplum,f rom the Latin verb eximere meaning "to take out". It is taken out of the religious community in order to represent that community,a nd likewise the individual belonging to that community,who takes the decision to make asacrifice,isrepresented by the sacrificed being. So the self of the one who sacrifiesisnot completely irrelevant;itisrelevant within the event of the immolation in as far as it is exemplified by the victim. Through the exemplification the self touchesu pon its negation carefully, with respectand awe,but never absorbs this negativity.
This absorption is,h owever, characteristic of western sacrifice.H ere,e very sacrifice primarilyb ecomes self-sacrifice,f rom Augustine,w ho exhorts us to 17 Nancy 2003, p. 57. 18 See the Epistle to the Hebrews 10:11-14, and Augustine:The City of God, Book X-6:"Of the Tr ue and Perfect Sacrifice." 19 Nancy 2003, p. 56. 20 Ibid., p. 57. presentour bodiesasa"living sacrifice" 21 ,toHegels phenomenology revealing this structure of self-sacrifice in asecular and systematic manner.Insuch adialecticization sacrifiera nd sacrificed become entangled, if not entirely synonymous.I nt his rupture with exemplarity and substitution, one meets the most important feature of westernized sacrifice,a ccordingt oN ancy. He offers two examples,one from Antiquity,one from Christianity.First he mentions Socratess death (a sacrifice not to the gods,but to truth and reasonand in this sense,the first major tale of as elf-sacrifice), then Gods incarnation in Christ. He thinks this incarnation, latera rticulated by Paul as kenosis, 22 as the becomingr adically humanofGod, that is,ofasacrifice of God as God into humanity,sothat of Godas-God nothing remains.T he central figure of worship is transformed from divinity to human mortal flesh (caro,henceincarnation). It is Christ who is divine only as human.
Then, doubling this sacrificeofGod in the narrative and subsequent doctrine of incarnation that has become the central trope of discussion and fascination throughout Christianitys history, the story of the gospels unfolds in such away that the paradoxical divinity of this humanbeing, of Christ consists in his being slaughtered. Thes acrifice of God into humanity doubles itself in as acrificeo f humanitythat, in this sacrifice,finds its divinity,that is,its being "not of this world" while being "in the world".
23 " […] Becoming man even unto death, God,lord and master over the death of all creatures,inflicts his death upon himself,returning to himself and his glorythe life and love he has lavished upon creation."
24 Or in a more rude,h arsh language,B ataille,w hom we will pay attention to in aw hile, adoptst he same approach to the coincidence of the incarnational sacrifice and humanlife as sacrifice:"God is dead. Hes so dead, in fact, that the only way to make this comprehensible is by killing myself."
25
Elsewhere Bataille addresses the sacrificial mode of existence as alimit-point, rather than as atransgression of limits.Self-sacrifice has little to do with aheroic decisiontoenter death, but it is ahesitant, even aporetic lingering on the limit of life:Hegels negation as an "endurance" of the moment between life and death, treated above.Only this limit-point is humanitys -isChrists -"divinity": "God is not humanitys limit-point, though humanitys limit-point is divine. Or put it this way -humanity is divinewhen experiencing limits."
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In view of our analysis of the dialectic movement as af orm of existential sacrifice,thoroughly dependent on Christian ethics and antropology (Hegel was very keen to admit this inheritance, as we saw above), It hink Nancy has good grounds to analyze the incarnation as an imitable sacrifice.Whereas traditional theology holds that Christ has sacrificed himself once,only to expel sacrifice from the world and thus preventhumans to sacrifice one another,amore challenging readingofthe incarnationalnarratives would conclude that withChrists deathon the cross,sacrifice has becomethe prime model for Christian life.Self-sacrifice as away of life is intensely presentinall threemonotheisms,but only in the Christian arche-narrative of the Gospels this self-sacrifice has been evoked in aliteral and physical way:the death of God on the Cross,endlessly remembered and repeated, even imitated in the traditions of eucharistic rituality.Considered in this sense,the eucharist is less aritual in which humanity is repeatedly redeemed from its sins throughC hrists "once and for all" sacrificial mediation -r esembling at raditional, pagan cleansing ritual -, but ar itual in which humanity is repeatedly exhorted to double Christs sacrifice -Christs death -intheir daily lives.Christ and his sacrifice are always with and among us,b ut this presence,t his parousia leads to nothing.Ithas no higher goal than… sacrificeitself.
Let me refine and clarify this rather unorthodox conclusionb yf ollowing Nancys argument, addingmycomments and excursions to it.
Sacrifice Becoming Ethical
What interests us here is the ethical transformationofsacrifice:much more than a religious act expressing the relation with gods,i tb ecomes al ife style.I" do" sacrifice,I"am" sacrifice,Il ead my life in as acrificial (and following from the centrality of this "I": self-sacrificial) mode. Iwill test myself rather than let myself be tested by God. Thetraces of this crypto-humanistic, ethical reduction of sacrifice can be found in the views on man and on the world -inthe anthropology and cosmology -o ft he Cynics and the Stoics in Antiquity,a nd their successors in Christian asceticism:h ere abandonment, moderation and limitation( being in accord, "in measure" with the cosmos by giving up selfhood and self-indulgence) are the indicators of the sacrificial logic,leading to the idea of adetached, "free", higher self that is actually selfless.T he so-called "ethical religions" (the three monotheisms) feed strongly on theseethical reshapings of sacrifice in the Roman world of the last centuries B. C.
Spiritualized and UniversalizedSacrifice
Similarly,next to its being "ethicized", western sacrifice is rendered spiritual and universal above all:itisnolonger concerned with areal offering, with slaughtering avictim, but, by extendingsacrifice to ethical life,itshifts the focus on the spirit of sacrifice.It"mimes" traditional, physicalsacrifice on aspiritualized level, Nancy writes,then quotingPascals famouswords:"Circumcision of the heart, true fast, true sacrifice,true temple:the prophets showed that all this must be spiritual. Not the flesh that perishes,but the fleshthat does not perish."
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Reflecting on this passage,N ancy goes as far as to state that the "truth of sacrifice" is that it dialecticizes itself literally:i t" sublates,a long with the flesh that perishes,the sacrificialmoment of sacrifice itself."
28 Exactly in this sublation, sacrifice becomes universal:itisthere every time and everywhere,and no longer needs the particularity of temporality and locality.
Against this background, it is strange and almost cynical to have to conclude that despitet he Wests spiritualizationo fs acrifice,i ts history has produced probably the most cruel and bloody slaughter of all humanity.T he question whether the de-ritualization of sacrifice,i ts liberationo ut of its ritual confinementsinfavor of aspiritual sacrifice,would has unleashed violenceonatotally different scale,n eeds to remain unanswered in this context. But posing and treating this question is all the more urgent in our time.O ne of the more lucid thinkers of the twentieth century, Georges Bataille has attempted to pose and elaborate this question in 1943, againstt he background of the atrocities of the Second World War. He paves the way for an understandingo fw hat universal sacrifice mightimply face to face with the "totalwar" fascism desired to absorb humanl ife into.H ere one meets at hinker who has gone thoroughly through Hegelian dialectics,w ho recognizesh ow right Hegel is in his articulation of modern life,and who still does not agree,bynomeans.Bataille reverts to his other teacher, Nietzsche,toshow how and why secular sacrifice and its dance around the negative is far from being ainnocentprogression in the history of humanity.What does universal sacrificial logic look like?W hat if it culminates finally into a practice,i nto ap olitics?T he task will then be -a nd Bataille,i n1 943, felt confronted with it -tothink a"sacrifice in which everything is victim". 29 Then he cites Nietzsche,w ho in Beyond Gooda nd Evil (1885) describes ahistoric" laddero f religious cruelty", proceeding from pre-western to medieval to modernsacrificial traditions, including the dialectical variety:
Finally -what remained to be sacrificed?Atlong last, did one not have to sacrifice for once whateveriscomforting,holy,healing;all hope,all faith in hidden harmony,infuture blisses and justices?Didnt one have to sacrifice God himself and, from cruelty against oneself,w orship the stone,s tupidity,g ravity,f ate,t he Nothing?T os acrifice God for Nothing -this paradoxical mystery of the final cruelty was reserved for the generation that is now comingup: all of us know already somethingofthis. However, this is only one side of Bataillesrethinking of sacrifice in the twentieth century. Thepolitical criticism of sacrifice,asBataille already diagnosed this in the "Psychological Structure of Fascism", 31 is avery complex criticism, for it entails an affirmative diagnosis at the same time.For Bataille the political extremities of his time mirrored atype of sacrifice that in his view can only by comprehended if one affirmsthat it is akey feature of modern,and indeed Western existence. In e. g. modern eroticism and ecstacy,the orgies are asecular transformationofarchaic, pagan rituals of sacrifice,hestates in his 1956 study Eroticism
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. This secularization of sacrifice has been preparedb yC hristianity,h ec laims,s ince Christianity has rejectedthe sacred character of erotic sacrifice by rendering it aprofane act. In eroticism "we" are all still Christians,and the flip side of this provocation is true too:C hristianity persists in secular modernity,n ot as ar eligion proper:a ni nstitution, achurch, but as eroticism and its irrationalabandonment.
How? According to Batailles train of thought, Christianity as well as modern eroticism (either in its literal, "real" shape,orinits evocations in art and literature, in the "violence of poetry" 33 )both follow the structure of sacrifice as self-sacrifice -a snegation. This is why Bataille,d espite his fierce criticism of Hegels phenomenologicals ystem, could easily observet hat "Hegel,c est lØvidence." And this observation is also asigh:"Often Hegel seems obvious, but this obviousness is hard to put up with." Let me revert to Nancys genealogyofsacrifice.F inally,having becomespiritualized and universalized, sacrifice opens the possibility of its secularization. As a life style,w hy would it need aG od, ah oly book, ar eligious doctrine,r itual traditions?T his secularization of sacrifice is not at all only am odern phenomenon, though we have seen above how radically it is interwoven with modern dialecticalg rowth. One meetst his secularization alreadyi nA ugustine.I nt he Confessions the dialectical movement between man and God, between theconfessing "I" giving everythinga way (indeed,c onfessioni ss urely af orm of selfsacrifice too) and its Other, is dominated in aremarkable way by the humanside of the relation."I" offermyself to God,but this Gods meaningorrole is primarily to give the "I" back to itself:sothe "I" be sublated, that is,purified, enriched.This movement between man and God has to be repeatedand renewed continuously, as we have seen, so that the negative, sacrificial momentiskept in the centreand 31 Bataille 1979 , pp.64-87. 32 Id. 2012 . 33 See Bataille 1976 . In this little radio speech, Bataille places the experience of sacrifice at the heart of his theoryofthe relationbetween the sacred and the secular. 34 Litt.: "Hegel is the obvious." Bataille 1988, p. 105. kept alive;but the Other in the relation is first of all afunction of the self.T he believers spirituality is concentrated not on worshipping transcendentpower, but on the discovery of ones own "truth", onesa uthenticity,a sIshowed above. Needless to say,A ugustine still puts al ot of effort in saving and preserving this transcendence,b ut the "highestG od" the author of the Confessions evokes,i s only meaningful as the "interior God": the God-in-me.Mark the central place of the meo (me,mine) in this well-known dictum:"Interiorintimo meo et superior summo meo." God is "more inward to me than the most inward part of me;and higher than my highestheight."God is my inward and my height.
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It is not difficult to see how such adialectical logic applied to the relation with God already announcesmodern dialectics.Individualism has not been invented by the modern era, but by early Christianity and one of its protagonists, Augustine. The"other" as God will, in modernity,betransformedinto the human other, and then ultimately into the other self," my" other self:t he secularization and humanization of self-sacrifice.But the ingredients for this transformation were already active in the Confessions.
Sacrifice Breaking with Instrumentality
Them eaning of this self-sacrificial movement analyzed so far reveals itself in a particular sense in Judaism. One only has to think of the strong exodic and nomadic exigency in the Thora. Thepeople of Israel may not settle and rest in and within its "self", its identity,but it can only experience its "self" as destination, that is by wandering in the desert, by being in exile,bybeing dispersed. Godspeople can only be Gods if it loses itself continuously,and persists in waiting for salvation, for a"promised land",for the Messiah. This self-sacrificial wandering and waitingiswhat counts.The Jewmust "dance around the negative": there lies the mystery of his religion. Pursuingthis approach to Judaisms preoccupation with leavingand roaming,with desertingoneselfand ones home in order to enter the homelessness of the desert where Jahwe can be met,o ne may need to say that Abrahams famous sacrifice (Gen. 22) of his son Isaac is not where his sacrificial life started.I nt he offering of the son Abraham is asked by God to give up everything, that is,tosacrifice the unthinkable;here it is still atest, ending well when God changes his plan and reverts to traditional substitutional sacrifice: Abraham is allowed to sacrifice ar am instead. But already in the first verse of Genesis 12, acrucialchapter opening the so-called Abrahamic narrative that will structure the rest of the book Genesis,A braham-then still named Abram -is summoned to leave behindeverything he has and start his nomadicjourney.Itis here that God requests Abram he abandon his "self", stop being who he is,and show he does not cling to anything contributing to his identity:"Now the Lord said to Abram, Go forth from your country,and from your relatives,and from your fathers house,tothe land which Iwill showyou…"
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Here one encounters most emphatically the third feature of westernized sacrifice Nancy mentions,t hat of ar upture with instrumentality.T he sacrifice of exodus toward desert life has no other goal than wandering;the "promised land" is not as traightforward goal to be reached after desertl ife;i ti sap romiseparalleltothe messianic expectation of the prophets,maybe -that moves on with the wandering journey,sothat in the end one does not know whether the desert is the promised land after all. Wheneverthe peoplearrives somewhere to settle,it must go on. And whenever it defiesthis logic and does settle after all, things go wrong and anew exile is due.Here,atthe dawn of western history,inthe stories of Tenach that,l ater,a lso have obtainedt heir central place in Christianity,o ne is confronted alreadyw ith the restless self,a ffirming itself as aconstantly moving and "growing" being,o rr ather, as dynamic and infinite growth itself.I ta lways comes backtoits negation,tothe negative moment we studied above when we dealt with the spectre of modern growthand its Hegelian complexities.W estern sacrificei ss elf-referential, it looks for its own gift time and again:i tis this gift caught up in the looping spiral of lost-and-found.
Death in Life, Life in Death
With regard to Islam,the self-sacrificial rigor of monotheism is advocated even more strongly,almost obsessively in the Koranic rhetoric suggestion that life and death are closely involved into one another -arhetorics trategy that is quite dominant throughout the suras:"[…] you were without life and [Allah] gave you life.H ew ill cause you to die and again bring you to life […] ." 37 Herei ti sG od himself whor egulates the sacrificial structureo fh uman existence,w ithoute ngaging himselfinthat life,asthe ChristianGod does in the incarnationalnarrative and doctrine. This is just one example of the way in which monotheism transposesdeath,and more significantly,the act of dying, towards life itself,the eternity and infinityof its "still waters" towards finite time:outside becomes inside without giving up its outside character.Monotheism invents and installs an art of living,alife style and af orm of spirituality (often expressedi na scetic exercisesa nd rituals) in which man experiences his existence,a sN ancye xplains in another text, "as al ife withdrawn from timei nt he very course of time." This amounts to an ew interpretation of the idea of eternallife -soinfluential in Islam from its beginning, and in Christianity from its middle,medieval period -aswell, since eternal life is now situated within finite,mortal life as its other:
36 Gen. 12:1 (NewAmerican StandardEdition). 37 Sura2:28. Maulana M. Ali Edition.
Batailles philosophical and literary work, in Heideggers existential analysis of Dasein as sein zum Tode (being toward death), or in Levinass exposure of the "I" in the ethical rapport to the other,the neighbour, in whomGod appears to me in order to give me back to myself as as elf who is "otherwise than being, beyond essence". Why growth?Why is it so self-evident and virtually non-negotiable?And why has dialectics,a tl east in the complexities of western history,b een the format for growth?Sothat growing eventually obeys to alogic of sacrifice?Wehave treated these questions in this article,t hat is about to end now in an inevitable coda, launching afurther question:why do we need growth?Isaworld, ahistory,alife thinkable beyond growth?
Af irst possibility of an answer to these questions lies in the attempt to rehabilitate and "re-imagine" sacrifice,asKathryn Mc Clymond does in her Beyond Sacred Violence. She criticizes the "western reduction" of sacrifice,draws attention for non-western sacrifice,f or example in Hindur eligious traditions, and claimsthat anon-essentialistic, pluralistic or "polythetic"approach to sacrifice as a"dynamic matrix of activity"can open our eyes to forms of sacrifice that would reach out "beyond violence". 42 But is westerns acrifice ar eduction,o rr ather a mimetic radicalization of traditional sacrifice?Isitphysicalviolence,orspiritual? And how close is dialectical life to McClymonds "matrix of activities" that would show how sacrificial gestures are apart of daily existence rather than belonging to the realmofwell-defined rituals? Nancyl ooksi nto asecond, different direction, not one of ac ertain re-evaluation of sacrifice,but one of "the effacement of sacrifice,ofcommunion, of the West", as he calls it towardsthe end of "The Unsacrificeable". Here,the attention is drawn to the unsacrificeable character of existence,a nd of the sense of that existence." Existence[ …] cant be sacrificed. It can only be destroyed or shared."
43 ForN ancy, the sharing (partage: ak ey concept in his entire work) of existence and of its continuously emerging, "happening", thati s, finite sense, "would effacethe sacrificialmimicry of an appropriation of the Other". 44 Sharing monotheism, but has to be deconstructed alongside the monotheistic religions as their building material. Both are figurations of the logos breaking away slowly from mythos and in this sense they are "laboratories" of new research on the relation between death and life. then sharing and sacrificedonolonger opposeone another, but rather are mutually contaminating and even inspiring concepts. As aconsequence,itisnecessary to explore athird way to answer the question of this coda. We may have to look for the "beyond" in dialectics, rephrasing it instead of trying to overcome it. Is Bataille right in stating that dialectics,inthe end, refuses any logic of growth, precisely because of what dialecticsi sa nd has always been:a"dance around the negative", installing the infinityofnegation in the heart of our lives and relations?What could be the potentialofBatailles idea that in the dialectical loop nothing is constituted but a nØgativitØ sansemploi that problematizest he system from the inside?
46 This is,a ccording to Bataille, a negativitythat leads nowhere but to the thresholdofexcess,where we are called to pull up between selfhooda nd loss of self.H ere,d ialectical sacrifice is "read against the grain", or againsti tself from within:adeconstructive approachu ndertaken by many critical philosophical responses to Hegeli nt he last half century. 47 Thekernelofall thesedeconstructions is the attempt to rid dialectics of the phantasm of growth.
But let me leave the issue of a"beyond" unanswered for the time being, inviting further research on this in the near future. 48 Let me end into the open, then, and stay faithful to the infinity of the coda. 49 Theu rgency of this issue merits such 46 Theformulation of a nØgativitØ sans emploi (idle,useless,litt. "unemployed" negativity)isused by Bataille in aletter to Alexandre Kojve dated 6december 1937. See Bataille 1973, pp.369-371. 47 As in Blanchots and Derridaswork, or in that of Nancy,asfar as The Restlessness of the Negative is concerned;in"TheUnsacrificeable", as we have seen, he tends to be more criticalofthe dialecticallogic proper, eventually aiming at arefutation of it. See in this perspective also Malabou 2005 . Malabourethinks the dialecticalmovement of the spirit towardsi ts Aufhebung as ag esture of plasticity: the spirit does not realize and elevate itself,but it rather"fashions" itself (like aplastic artist, asculptor e. g.,fashionshis stone material) continuously À aprocess,an"act" that follows,according to Malabou, the structureo f" simplification" and surrender to "habit" instead of as tructure of amplification and growth (p.152). In the "plasticoperation" (p.145) the spirit "reduces its own resistance,b ecomes more supple,f lexible,m alleable […]", and in this way "an alienation we could call sacrificial"is"elicited [from]spirit".The dialectical schema boils down, Malabou states,tothis self-fashioning and -refashioning of the spirit, in which it rendersitself "plastic", that is,it"distances itself from itself", and "shedsits own self", in a "self-sacrifice" that is at the same time its "survival", its futurelife and potentiality.See p. 152 for all citations.H ere,d ialectics is rethought by distancing it from growth but not from sacrifice.I ndeed, the plastic gesture is dialectics beyond right within dialectics. 48 This invitation is,i naway,a lready being accepted, and serves as adriving force behind current work in progress,leading to my book on humanism and Christianity,in progress. 49 "Coda" literally means the tail of ab ody:n ot af inale or conclusion, but ap art future research, for the schemaHegel still put his faith into,howevercomplex and nuanced his train of thoughthas been, may well be exhausted and have become self-destructive in the 21 st century.Adifficult shift willimpose itself in the coming decades,ashift in our views on economy,onlife style,onour relation with nature and with the globe,a nd on the plurality of intercultural, complexa nd hybrid identities in aglobalizing world.
